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Cases on Insurance. By George W. Goble. Indianapolis: The
Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1931. pp. xxxix, 898.
THE reader who takes up this volume is first struck by the excellence of its
typography and the completeness of its equipment. No other source book
that has come under the eye of this reviewer compares with this in the exten-
sive and efficient aids to its use as a teaching implement. Besides the usual
table setting out the 273 cases reported more or less fully in the text, it con-
tains an additional table of some thousand cases which are commented upon
or quoted from in the text and notes. There is also a list, extending over ten
pages, of articles and notes in various law school periodicals, which are cited
in the book. This list, while not including all useful citations within the field
indicated, nor even all that are actually given in the book, affords a much
more nearly complete catalogue of periodical literature pertinent and avail-
able than can be found in any other similar collection of materials intended
for student use. Granted that at least half of these hundreds of notes and
comments are of no earthly value, unless it be to afford a sort of autoptic
preference showing that some problems in insurance law are too difficult even
for law students and law teachers, yet this vast array of pertinent comment
will prove an invaluable aid in effective study of this subject; and to require
discriminating exclusion of the useless items would place too heavy a burden
even upon such an omnivorous reader as Professor Goble has proved himself
to be.
The author's annotation of the cases reported is unusually extensive and
thorough. The notes contain not only citations of other cases treating of
varying phases of the problems presented by the principal cases, quotations
from opinions in related cases and from relevant essays, and, as already
indicated, a wealth of citations of articles in legal periodicals, but also
numerous questions that search out the bases of the decisions reported or
demand the solution of related problems arising from variant factual situa-
tions. Almost without exception these questions are followed by citations of
cases and articles which will aid in answering them. There are eager and
earnest teachers who think that such questions should be left up in the air,
and the student with them, unless he has wit and courage sufficient to bring
himself unaided safe to earth. But after all the student has only three years
in the law school. He is given cyclopedias, digests and textbooks to aid him
in solving problems with maximum efficiency and minimum time cost. lils
casebook should be so constructed as to aid as well as stimulate his further
researches. While no single student can possibly be expected to investigate
all the problems suggested in the vast number of questions Professor Goble
has incorporated in his notes, they cannot but be very helpful to every
teacher who is giving a course on the law of insurance and especially to one
who is newly teaching the subject. He may well allow his classroom discus-
sions to be guided by the questions thus raised. Such teachers will also lind
valuable the author's suggestion, contained in the preface, as to omissions that




But after all pedagogic aids are but aids. The real value of the work must
be determined by the quality and arrangement of the material selected. In
this respect Professor Goble's work is admirably done. At the outset the
reader is struck by the large proportion of non-judicial material included.
Extracts from books on the economics and practice of the business of insur-
ance and from legal treatises and essays on the subject, all, or nearly all,
valuable and interesting, account in the aggregate for some sixty pages.
Surely this shows a desirable tendency in the making of source books for law
teaching, and promises an escape from the tyranny of the so-called "case
system" narrowly followed.
The author's preface tells us that "the classification of the material in this
work does not follow conventional lines." Perhaps it would be better to say
that the arrangement differs from that of any preceding casebook on insur-
ance. The same "duster points" are used, but the major and minor groups of
cases follow in a changed order. But in any event one may commend the
straight-forwardness of the arrangement and especially of the headings at-
tached to chapters, sections and sub-topics. There is a refreshing absence of
verbal legerdemain. No attempt ismade by the use of unfamiliar phraseology,
by large importations from the language of the economists and sociologists,
to create an impression of aggressive originality and great learning. The
reader seeks in vain for the alluring ex\pressions "behaviour," "judicial reac-
tion," "sociological aspects." And yet the non-legal material included in the
collection, the arrangement of judicial decisions and the implications of prob-
lem questions posed in the notes, show an awareness of the significance of
sociological and economic backgrounds, and of the general relationship of
law to the other social sciences, that needs no advertising.
As to the wisdom of the author's classification and arrangement of the
material used one has some doubt. An experienced teacher of law knows
that it rarely makes much difference in what order the group of concepts
more or less clearly delimited by judicial action are studied, so long as natural
relationships are observed. The question whether constitutional law is to be
given at the beginning or end of the three year course will not prove fatal,
however decided. Whether one goes from London to Dover, or from Dover
to London, the scenery is pretty much the same.
All this being granted one yet gets the impression that Professor Goble
has over-classified his material, has arranged it too laboriously. After some
introductory extracts from non-judicial writings, printed under the caption
"The Function and Theory of Insurance," the author divides his work into
two parts. Part I bears the title "Personal Insurance (Life and Accident) ,"
while Part II, entitled "Property Insurance," appears to include all other
kinds. While the titles "Personal Insurance" and "Property Insurance" are
sometimes used by writers on the business of insurance, they do not seem Vell
suited to the use of lawyers. To no one are life and accident insurance more
"personal" than are health and unemployment insurance, and to the lawyer
liability insurance is not less personal. Indeed all kinds of insurance are but
devices to protect persons against the risk of losing (1) earning power (life,
accident, health, unemployment); (2) interests in property (fire, marine,
fidelity, theft and hundreds of other kinds); and (3) immunity (liability,
workmen's compensation, physician's defense, qtc.). All kinds are equally
personal. However, if the author wishes to use these particular expressions as
labels for his two major groups of phenomena, the user of the books will
probably suffer no evil effects, even though they be unhappily chosen.
But can we say the same thing of his assumption that "Personal Insurance"
contracts form a homogeneous group so different from "Property Insurance"
that the two groups must be treated independently? In his preface he likens
the teacher who tries to treat life, fire and marine policies concurrently to
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the unhappy circus rider "trying to ride the elephant, the bear and the
kangaroo at the same time." One might suggest the substitution of the sala-
mander and the hippopotamus as better typifying fire and marine contracts;
but however that may be, the writer seems inconsistent in furnishing his
pedagogic circus rider with only two parts when he must ride three such
beasts. The reply seems to be that in order to be consistent, he would need
to give two score separate treatments, which would be impossible and absurd.
The author's method of treating independently life and accident policies in
one group and all other kinds in a second group is not impossible or absurd,
but, in the opinion of the reviewer, it is wasteful and unwise. Accident and
liability insurances have more common characteristics than have those of
life and accident. Fire and life insurances have as many common problems
and practices as have fire and marine contracts. And so throughout the list
of scores of insurances bearing recognized labels, there are present some
differentiating factors, but more common elements grounded in the common
economic function of distributing losses arising from infinitely varying perils,
and the common general method of accomplishing this adequately and equit-
ably. It would seem to be wiser to treat the many common elements commonly,
and only the differentiating factors independently.
But one cannot predicate right and wrong of classifications. Convenience
is the only test. If Professor Goble's classification and arrangements are
found by experience to be more convenient and effective than others we shall
gladly adopt them, whatever may have been our a priori views.
It goes without saying that no self-respecting review should fail to point
out the errors into which the author has fallen; otherwise the reviewer's
superior knowledge of the subject might be questioned. And there are a few
errors here that should be corrected. For example, it is stated (p. 62, n. 17]
that in the two cases cited the "beneficiary" was allowed to recover for the
insurer's negligent delay in acting on a life application. In fact it was the
insured's administratrix that recovered in each case. The intended bene.
ficiary seems never to have been allowed a cause of action, for what reason
is not clear. So it is expressly stated [p. 48, n. 12] and elsewhere implied
[pp. 18, n., and 574, n.] that insurance has been declared by the courts to
be a public utility whereas it is believed that they have never gone farther
than to assert that it is sufficiently affected with a public interest, whatever
that may mean, to be subject to regulation, even to the extent of fixing prem-
ium rates. Other slips could perhaps be noted; but it should be added that
the accuracy of the annotation, considering its wide scope, is truly remarkable.
The criticisms made above, if such they be, are of little importance when
viewed in relation to the excellence of this work as a whole. Its use in the
class-room can hardly fail to be interesting and stimulating.
Yale University. W. R. VANCe.
The Interstate Commerce Commission. By I. L. Sharfman. Part I.
New York: The Commonwealth Fund. 1931. pp. xvi, 317.
$3.50.
ABOUT a decade ago The Legal Research Committee of the Commonwealth
Fund began an extensive study of administrative law. Professor Ernst
Freund's volume, Administrative Powers over Persons and Property, served
as an introductory survey of the general field. The Foundation designs to
supplement the introductory volume with specific studies of administrative
bodies. The Federal Trade Commission was first subjected to analysis by
Gerard C. Henderson. The Interstate Commerce Commission is likewise to
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be portrayed in an intensive study, and the present volume, covring the
legislative basis of the Commission's authority, is to be followed by three
additional Parts. The remaining Parts will cover, respectively, the scope
of the Commission's jurisdiction, the character of its activities, and the
nature of its organization and procedure.
For the general student of administrative law as well as for the intend-
ing practitioner before the Commission, there is no other book which so
clearly and impartially recites the forty-year evolution of Federal legislation
in railroad regulation. Professor Sharfman, a competent exTert in this
domain, recognizes to the full how inevitably the new type of administrative
organ of government contravenes the rigid though hoary doctrine of the
complete separation of governmental powers. Mr. Justice Holmes, in his
dissenting opinion in Springer v. Philippine Islands,1 has demonstrated
forcibly and with latent humor how impossible it is to put the old wine of the
sharp separation of governmental powers into the new bottles of expanding
administrative law. Professor Sharfman, without rearguing the point, states
correctly that the Commission, "as a functioning tribunal . . . oversteps
at almost every turn the so-called separation of governmental powers;"
that "in its determination of controversies it is exercising judicial authority,
and in its prescription of future adjustments it is itself enunciating legis-
lative policy." [p. 288]. It is a relief to see this factual treatment of the
Commission's activities. The trammels of "justness," "reasonablenezs" and
"public interest" which are supposed to confine that tribunal's functions to
the specific enforcement of statutory standards are largely illusory. It is
time that such verbal veils as "quasi-legislative" and "quasi-judicial" be
discarded.
But if the Commission's present ample exercise of broadly discretionary
power be conceded, the history of the acquisition of that power is nowhere
better traced than in Professor Sharfman's treatise. The original Act to
Regulate Commerce of 1887 was almost twenty years old before it developed
a set of legal teeth, in the Hepburn Amendment of 1906. Since then, and
particularly in the Transportation Act of 1920, its powers have continu-
ously widened and deepened. "The legislative structure is primarily sig-
nificant, therefore, because of its organic relationship to the character of
the Commission's powers and processes."
If any qualification of this volume's delineation of the Commission's
present powers is in order, it may be suggested that sometimes the mark
is a bit overshot in such findings as that "any clearcut differentiation be-
tween the spheres of private management and public control is largely
obliterated." [p. 248]. It ought not to be forgotten that since 1920 some-
thing over five billions have been invested in additions and betterments to
the nation's railroad property. The initiative in determining the form and
shape that these additions and betterments shall take lies almost entirely
within the discretion of the railway managements, and outside that of the
Commission. True it is, that where security issues are a prerequisite, the
Commission's approval must first be obtained. There is a chance of a suz-
pensive veto here. But the veto goes rather to the details of the financing,
not to the inception or origination of the projects for capital outlay. The
present law purports to empower the Commission to order the building of
extensions, but except for minor extensions, the supposed power is of dubi-
ous value, as Professor Sharfman recognizes in the case of Public Stirdcc
Comnmission of Oregon v. Central Pacific Ry.2 While this substantive origi-
nating power remains in the hands of the railway managements, it can
1277 U. S. 189, 48 Sup. Ct. 480 (1927).
2 159 I. C. C. 6:30 (1929).
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hardly be said that all "of the significant activities of the carriers are sub-
jected to governmental control" [p. 283], if that be construed to mean that
significant discretion no longer resides in railway directorates.
Yale University. WINTHROP M. DANIMLS.
Essays in Jurisprudence and the Common Law. By Arthur L.
Goodhart. Cambridge: At the University Press. New York:
The Macmillan Co. 1931. pp. xiii, 295. $5.
THROUGHOUT this collection of very readable essays an authoritarian philos-
opher conducts a search for fundamental principles. He seeks to show us
the difficulty in the solution of modern problems caused by our lack of
formulation of the underlying fundamental principles. Few labor leaders in
England, for example, realize the truth of the author's statement that "the
'question whether a general strike is legal under the law as it stands is at
present one of the most important-if not the most important-problem
to be considered in planning new legislation." [p. 226]. In other essays he
shows the importance of the search for other principles such as possession,
negligence, and ultra vires. Sometimes, however, the author fails in his
search, as when he sadly admits that "the law of divorce is based on no
discoverable principle." [p. 43]. This is an unfortunate state of affairs in
so important a field. It even raises grave misgivings as to whether the law
of divorce is really a "law" at all in any accurate sense.
In the first essay, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case, we are shown that the
search for principles must be conducted in a certain and orderly manner, or
else the principle which we discover may not be a "principle" at all, but
something else which the author neglects to name. We must therefore con-
stantly keep in mind that the real "principle" of a case is not based on the
reasons, nor the rule, nor on all'the ascertainable facts. Instead we must
look only (a) at the facts the judge treated as material, and (b) the rea-
sons based on these facts alone. In this process certain "facts" (of person,
time, place, kind and amount) have the mysterious property of being Im-
material unless stated to be material. All other more gifted facts are ma-
terial unless treated by the judge as immaterial. The actual facts of the
record should be ignored whenever the judge states enough factg to make
this possible. Librarians should therefore use every effort to keep such
records of cases from immature students. The author warns us of this
when he says: "The emphasis which American Law libraries are now plac-
ing on collecting the whole records in the leading cases may prove to be
a dangerous one, for such collections tend to encourage a practice which is
inconvenient in operation and disastrous in theory." [p. 13]. Where there
are several opinions written "which agree as to result but differ as to ma-
terial facts, then the principle of the case is limited so as to fit the sum of
all the facts held material by the various judges"-without dividing them by
the number of judges sitting.
The author is not troubled by what "facts" are, nor by their variety, nor
with distinguishing them from conclusions of "law." For he points out that
"the material facts which are usually found in any legal situation are
strictly limited. Thus the fact that there must be consideration in a simple
contract is a single material fact, although the kinds of consideration are
unlimited." [p. 24]. So also we assume that Proximate Cause, Ultra Vires,
Negligence, Intent and Domicile would be considered as "single material
facts." At any rate it is out of such materials that we discover principles,
which, when discovered, are absolutely final, at least in England because of
the rule of, stare decisis.
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The author proves that this is true in his essay on Case Law in Eng-
land and America by the simple method of showing that nearly all the Eng-
lish writers believe it. True, a certain Professor W. Jethro Brown of
Australia suspects the English Courts of an ingenious ability to distinguish
away an inconvenient precedent. But as Mr. Goodhart points out, "Un-
fortunately Professor Brown does not give any references to prove these
ingenious distinctions" and "a statement unsupported by citations is of
doubtful value however distinguished the writer may be." [p. 54]. Professor
Brown being thus disqualified because he appeared in public without foot-
notes, the motion is unanimously carried that English courts follow prece-
dent to any inconvenient result because forced to do so by the inexorable
application of legal principles to such single material facts as "Considera-
tion," "Ultra, vires," "Negligence," etc. In that way we achieve a very high
degree of certainty of result.
In America, on the other hand, stare decisis is not so well observed. This
is proved by the fact that so many American writers admit that courts
find means, direct and indirect, of evading it. The reason, however, is ap-
parent to the observer of underlying social conditions. As Mr. Goodhart
points out: "In England with its comparatively stabilized civilization ... the
desire for logical consistency is paramount .... In the United States on
the other hand with its rapidly changing social conditions . . . it has been
found necessary for the courts to be more venturesome." [p. 280]. Again:
"Perhaps the English Jurist is faced with fewer problems than are his
brothers in Canada and the United States for in England, where the divi-
sion between the past and present is less marked than it is in the rapidly
changing social conditions of America, there is not the same need for legal
adjustment." [p. 31]. England must have been an interesting place in which
to live during the industrial revolution when the future was not so cut and
dried as it is in the year 1931.
One might think that the consistent application of such certain rules
would make the English law too rigid. Fortunately the occasional weak
judge has saved the situation, and we marvel at a legal system which can
turn even its worst decisions to such good ends. Mr. Goodhart shows how
this is done as follows: "For that matter, by what may seem a strange
method to those who do not understand the theory of the common law, it is
precisely those cases which have been decided on incorrect principles or
reasoning which have become the most important in the law. New principles
of which their authors were unconscious or which they may have misunder-
stood, have been established by these judgments. Paradoxical as it may
sound, the law has frequently owed more to its weak judges than it has
to its strong ones. A bad reason may often make good law." [p. 3].
Whether England still needs a few weak judges to furnish it with new
principles is not clear. Probably not with its present stability. However,
the paragraph shows us the mysterious ways of stare decisis. If an English
judge creates a new principle intentionally, he is false to his vows. But if
he does it through ignorance, a kindly Providence intervenes to guide his
stumbling footsteps up to the green pastures and beside the still waters.
Apparently Providence does not act this way in America because Mr.
Goodhart says that "In America there are as many able lawyers as there
are in England but there is also a far larger number of less competent ones.
Unfortunately it is of frequent occurrence that the cases which are of the
greatest importance to law as a science are argued by lawyers of the sec-
ond class." [p. 73].
The conclusion that England still clings to artificially found principles
while America is abandoning them is puzzling to the reviewer, in the light
of so much evidence of an English retreat from them. That vast field of
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legal philosophy known as pleading has in England been buried under a
simple administrative device. The method of English criminal appeals has
removed another great field of the law at least partially from the difficulties
of binding doctrine. The taxing of costs certainly makes extremely difficult
the path of the litigant who feels sure that he can vindicate some principle
on appeal. And also one wonders how many inconvenient cases are quietly
taken out and buried under the process which the author describes as fol-
lows: "Only a small proportion of the decided cases are reported each
year; unless a case deals with a novel point of law-and novelty is strictly
construed-it will rarely find its way into the reports." [p. 57]. Of course
any principle can be made very clear and definite-if one is only permitted
to select some cases and ignore others. The system seems excellent, but does
its excellence consist in the fact that the unchanging and stabilized social con-
ditions of England in the year 1931 encourage stare decisis, or in the many
concealed escapes from the consequences of that doctrine?
The reviewer's interest in the underlying philosophy of the book has led
him to neglect its many merits. It is written in a lucid style which makes
difficult abstractions easy to read. When the author escapes from his theo-
ries, as in the essay on Costs, his work justifies the highest praise. And
even as to the philosophy, we must admit the curious paradox which clings
to all judicial institutions. That paradox, though difficult to express, may
be put in this way. If courts, or at least persons who deal with courts, did
not so firmly believe that justice was dispensed according to the inexorable
dictates of impersonal rules, our machinery of justice might suffer a strange
change which might not be agreeable even to realists. It may be that just
as an individual needs to cherish dreams and illusions, so also must his
judicial institutions.
Yale University. THURMAN W. ARiOLD.
The Equity of Redemption. By R. W. Turner. Cambridge: At
the University Press. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1931.
pp. lxxii, 198. $5.
A SOBER and closely reasoned general preface by Professor Harold Dexter
Hazelton, the editor of the Cambridge Studies in English Legal History,
introduces this study by Mr. Turner of the development of the equity of
redemption. In this finely integrated essay, Professor Hazeltine demonstrates
with a wealth of illustration drawn from an abundant scholarship, that,
while the law of security and especially land security has had a development
exhibiting similar phenomena in England and the modern European coun-
tries whose codes are based on the Roman law, the English law of mort-
gages contains few, if any, elements borrowed directly from the law of the
Romans. What we see in nearly all countries is merely a general progress
from the forfeit idea to the conception that the gage or pledge is collatorlal
security and a recognition of forms of security where the debtor remains In
possession of the res until default in the payment of the loan.
Mr. Turner's essay, consisting of eight chapters and an appendix, is obvi-
ously the product of one who has supplemented a long and cmprehensive
acquaintance with his subject matter by much original examination of early
authorities. The materials are conveniently arranged and adequately docu-
mented. Chapters I and II, dealing with the common law conception of
estate and the foundation of the equity of redemption, are followed by a
discussion of the important decisions of Lord Hale and Lord Nottingham
and the enduring influence of Lord Hardwicke upon the conception of
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equity of redemption as an estate in land. Mr. Turner is confident enough
of his ground on most questions to feel no hesitancy in stating frankly the
points upon which he is doubtful, such as the grounds upon which equitable
jurisdiction over mortgages was first assumed. It seems evident, as he
indicates, that the chancellors must have been greatly concerned to relieve
mortgagors against unjust imprisonment. In the .first case where the
chancellor decreed a reconveyance (1456) there were peculiar circum-
stances amounting to fraud and oppression by the mortgagee. The chancel-
lor's jurisdiction likely arose in a relief against satisfied bonds.
In chapter V Mr. Turner includes an historical account of the nature of
the mortgagor's possession from earliest times to the Real Property Act
of 1925. Chapter VI, which is amplified to some extent in Professor Hazel-
ton's preface, discusses the influence of Roman law and the movement
toward hypotheca. Chapter VII is a brief essay on rights in rcm and rights
in personazam with particular reference to the equity of redemption. Chapter
VIII covers in separate subdivisions analogies of the equity of redemption
and the trust, the mortgagee as trustee, the theory of cloggings and the
mortgagor and the franchise. 'The appendix 'considers briefly the changes
wrought by the Law of Property Acts, 1922-1926. The legal charge is now
generally adopted as the form of land security in England, but it is still
possible to grant a term for years to secure repayments of money at a fixed
date. Mr. Turner contends that although the legal right to redeem ceases
when the date for payment has passed, the mortgagor's equitable right to
redeem is the same today as before 1926.
Mr. Turner is never pontifical. The few instances where a tone of mild
dogmatism is apt to provoke comment, deal with matters having small rele-
vance to his main thesis. An instance of the latter sort is the discussion
of Sir Francis Bacon and his suggestion that Bacon's interest in Shakes-
peare is now generally accepted. It is interesting to read this observation
at a time when Mr. Leslie Hotson's Shakespearian researches have demon-
strated some of Shakespeare's personal reasons for touching upon legal
matters in certain of his plays.
When Englishmen in the 17th century settled various areas on the op-
posite side of the Atlantic, not only were courts established, but, to a great
extent, -the legal institutions of England, including the mortgage and the
equity of redemption, were introduced. The early judges in these colonies
and provinces were frequently literate. The records of the opinions of theze
judges and the statutes enacted by various political subdivizionz have in-
troduced interesting variations into the law of mortgages, an account of
which would make a valuable supplement to Mr. Turner's admirable com-
position. These records are probably not available in Mr. Turner's own
country, but if he, or those interested in his thesis, were ever in a position
to make an expedition to the region colonized by the Englishman of the
17th century, he might discover the materials for additional chapters.
Columbia University. JOHN HAmN;,.
C ces on the Law of Evidemwe. By Edward W. Hinton. Second
edition. St. Paul: The West Publishing Co. 1931. pp. xviii,
971. $6.50.
TwELVN years have elapsed since the first edition of Hinton's Cases on Evi-
dence, and no edition of a generally recognized casebook on the subject has
appeared since 1925, when Maguire's revised edition of Thayer's Cases on
Evidence was published. This alone, in view of recent developments in the
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law of evidence, made a second edition of Hinton's Cases both desirable
and timely.
The number of pages of case material has been reduced from 1087 to
962, 194 cases in the first edition have been omitted, and 149 new cases
have been added, the latter constituting about one-fourth of the total num-
ber of cases., With the exception of Chapter 6 no change has been made
in the chapter headings. That chapter is now entitled "Preferred Evidence"
instead of "The Best Evidence," and includes in section 1, "Proof of Exe-
cution of Attested Documents," cases dealing with rules of preference for
attesting witnesses, formerly dealt with in section 2 of Chapter 2, under
the heading "Required Witnesses." The omission and the division of cer-
tain sections and the relabeling of others are distinct improvements. Tie
wisdom of relegating to a footnote,2 however, all cases relating to offers
of evidence and objections may be seriously questioned.
Aside from these and a few other minor changes, the arrangement of
the topics is that of the first edition. The chief criticism of the present
arrangement is that it offers a great temptation for the instructor to upend
too much time on Chapter 1, "The Court and the Jury." Since the instructor
will generally feel it necessary to supplement the cases with other material
and time-consuming discussion on rules of substantive law and procedure,
thorough consideration of -the cases on Presumptions and the Burden of
.Proof, Judicial Notice, and Determination of the Admissibility of Evidence
will not infrequently result in neglecting the questions of admissibility
which are raised in the chapters devoted to exclusionary rules. In the use
of the casebook by an instructor having this view, one solution is to take
up the first chapter last and thus avoid the temptation until it ceases to
be inviting; another is to have the relation of the pleadings to the proof
and incidental matters included in the course on procedure. 3 It may be
noted that Professor Hinton in placing these topics in the first chapter
follows Thayer, while the first solution suggested is substantially carried
out in Wigmore's Cases and is recommended in a modified form in Ma-
guire's recent Supplement to Thayer's Cases.
A doubt arises in regard to the arrangement of cases in the last two
sections of Chapter 6, showing the application of the best evidence rule.
Although it is possible to consider more cases in consecutive order than in
the first edition, due to the chronological arrangement of every case in both
sections, it is still necessary to rearrange the cases if the various branches
of the rule are to be taken up in logical order. Slight attention is often
given to the rule because of general agreement with Thayer's view.4 But
the fact that mere mention of the term "best evidence" deludes students
into a feeling of false security makes it seem advisable to consider the rule
in detail, if it is to be considered at all, for there are many who accept
Lord Hardwicke's statement that, "The judges and sages of the law have
laid it down thai there is but one general rule of evidence, the best that the
nature of the case will admit." r
While the references to most of the important law review articles are
a valuable addition, the meager citations to Wigmore's treatise 0 and the
failure to cite more comments and notes, particularly those written by
I The greatest number of changes were made in Chapter 2, "Witnesses,"
and Chapter 3, "Hearsay".
2 p. 109.
3 CLARK, CASES ON PROCEDURE (1930) c. 6.
4 THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE CoMON LAW
(1898) 497.
5 Omychund v. Barker, 1 Atk. 46, 49 (1744).




Professor Hinton, are regrettable. Professor Hinton commented 7 on several
new cases included in the second edition, namely, State v. Martin, Lemon.
v. Leighton, Petition of Talbot, Raffel v. United States, Pan-American Pe-
troleum & Transport Company v. United States and A. B. Leach & Co. v.
Peirson, and on many other cases raising interesting problems of evidence.8
Their omission is no doubt attributable to the author's characteristic mod-
esty. With this exception the footnotes, in most instances, contain adequate
reference to case material and periodical literature.
The author did not see fit to include problem cases, and his statement
in the preface that they "clutfer the collection" and that "teachers usually
prefer to supply their own problems" seems questionable in view of the
success of Maguire's revised edition of Thayer's Cases', which contains over
400. It is hoped that the third edition will have this feature as well as the
most recent innovation, the inclusion of excerpts from law review articles,
comments and notes.
A comparison of the two editions of Hinton shows that the second edition
is not a first edition with a few new cases and citations. The author has
performed a difficult task in a most creditable manner.
George Washington University Law School. WILLIA I T. Famn.
Rights of Aliens under the Federal Constitution. By Norman
Alexander. Montpelier: Capital City Press. 1931. pp. vi, 153.
THE legal treatment of the status and condition of an alien in the United
States from either the standpoint of international or constitutional law
is specially complicated because they are subject to both State and Federal
control. The approach chosen by Samuel MlacClintock in 1909,' and by
Mr. Alexander in 1931, has been the constitutional test. In the years which
have elapsed since Mr. MlacClintock presented his essay, treating alienage
and citizenship, Federal legislation, and treaty rights of resident aliens,
little or no intensive study has been made of the condition of aliens in the
United States. Consequently Mr. Alexander's study is especially welcome.
He has chosen a broader field than Mr. MacClintock and has included
material upon the scope of Federal authority over aliens, the constitutional
rights of aliens in exclusion and expulsion proceedings, civil rights of aliens,
and aliens and due process of the law.
The effort and skill involved in the collection of pertinent cases and
statutes will evoke the appreciation of every one who comes to use this
book. The efficient brevity of the summaries of the more important cases,
welded into the text itself, renders the treatment the more valuable.
The thoroughness with which Mr. Alexander has treated the chapter upon
the civil rights of aliens, not hesitating to point out economic causes of
discrimination and the weakness or failure of the constitutional protection,
makes the third chapter outstanding. In view of the many able discussions
of the deportation problems, it seems lamentable that Mr. Alexander did
not devote his entire attention to the question of civil rights and due proc-
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Rnv. 320, a comment on Donald Friedman & Co., Inc. v. Newman, which
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ess (the material upon which chapters III and IV are based), elaborating
in particular the discussion of the alien and the treaty-making power.
The position of the foreign consul under treaty in succession cases, for
example, has a history in cases alone which deserves a more infensive
treatment, as do some of the post-war cases on the treaty rights of former
alien enemies.
Yale University. PHOEBi M ORISON.
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The Law of Mortgages of Land. By John D. Falconbridge. Sec-
ond edition. Toronto: Canada Law Book Company, Ltd. 1931.
pp. lxxix, 807.
THIS work (by the author of the Canadian Law of Banking and Bills of
Exchange) is a comprehensive treatise on the Law of Mortgages of Land,
minutely indexed, in which the law is stated in clear and simple language.
No doubt the book will be fully reviewed in one or more of the Canadian
legal periodicals, and its utility to the Canadian reader fully discussed.
It is the purpose of this review to point out wherein this leading text book
on the subject in Canada may be of use and interest to the lawyer and
student in the United States.
Substantial portions of the law stated in the book are applicable In the
United States as well as in Canada. Especially is this true of chapter III,
which deals with a legal mortgage in equity and clearly expounds such
equitable doctrines as the clogging of the equity of redemption and dis-
guised forms of mortgage, and chapter V, which treats the subject of
equitable mortgages, including floating charges created by corporations.
The chapters on accounting between mortgagor and mortgagee, on interest,
and on costs in mortgage actions will be of great assistance to American
lawyers who have mortgage foreclosures in making up accounts in these
actions. Likewise the detailed discussion of the mortgage contract itself,
the nature of the mortgagee's title, and his remedies in case of default, to-
gether with the rights which accrue to the mortgagor by reason of equitable
principles, and of the vexed subjects of subrogation and marshalling and
other problems arising out of the transfer of the equity of redemption,
will unquestionably be of use and interest to the American lawyer. In the
first edition observations upon the subject of conflict of laws were scattered
throughout the book, but in this edition the author has gathered together
the results of recent investigations in that field in a separate chapter deal-
ing adequately with the subject as it relates to mortgages.
From time to time practitioners in the United States must have to do
with Canadian registry and land titles acts, especially those of Ontario
and the border provinces in the North-West. The effect of the Ontario
Registry Act, and particularly the sections which deal with the registration
and priorities of mortgages in Ontario, is fully explained. In Alberta
and Saskatchewan exclusively, in Manitoba to a large extent, and In On-
tario to a limited extent, the system of land titles (Torrens system) pre-
vails. The statutes which govern this system of recording titles to land
have modified greatly the application of legal and equitable principles in
regard to mortgages; and the author outlines the main principles underly-
ing such statutes and discusses the effect of the statutes upon legal and
equitable estates and priorities between mortgagees.
The author confesses in the preface that he has allowed himself a cer-
tain liberty of criticism of decided cases, and since the effect of the deci-
sions is clearly stated, this critical attitude adds to the value of the bool.
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The arrangement is logical and follows the course of a mortgage transaction
from its formation to its conclusion. There is a complete analytical table
of contents, and a corresponding summary of topics at the opening of each
chapter is very useful to anyone who wishes to reach quickly the point
which he is seeking. The book, by reason of its literary merits and its
elaborate treatment of a difficult subject, is one which should be found in
the library of every practitioner whose practice leads him into the field
of mortgage and finance.
Toronto, Cinada. GEORGE ALEXADER URQUHrT.
Selected Readings on the Law of Coztracts. Published under the
auspices of the Association of American Law Schools. New
York: The Macmillan Co. 1931. pp. xcvi, 1320.
THIs book comprises reprints of a hundred or more leading articles, notes
and book reviews relating to the law of contracts, selected by a committee
appointed by the Association of American Law Schools from American and
English law reviews and other legal periodicals. In a witty introduction
Chief Judge Cardozo, of the New York Court of Appeals, points out the
importance of these publications wherein "academic scholarship is chart-
ing the line of development and progress in the untrodden regions of the
law", and the value of bringing together in permanent and convenient form
this pamphlet material. "Truth, no longer vagrant, is here dignified
and honored in the respectable security of an indubitable book."
In the main the selected articles are reproduced in their original form.
In a number of instances, however, the authors of the respective articles
have revised their work for this publication, and in some cases the com-
mittee have made some slight revisions. The arrangement of the articles is
by groups under much the same general topical headings as one would
expect to find in a text book on the subject.
The mechanical aids to the use of the contents are excellent. There is a
comprehensive alphabetical table of cases cited or discussed and a very
well worked out general index to the topics dealt with. To this is added
a "Selective Bibliography of Periodical Literature on Contracts", also
topically arranged, which seems to cover about all of the useful law review
material available, whether or not reprinted in this volume. The result
is not only to make the appropriate material of the book itself easily ac-
cessible to anyone seeking law on a particular topic of contract law, but
also to make the work a very convenient tool wherewith to reach other
sources of authority.
While in a general way these articles cover the entire subject of con-
tracts, one must not expect to find this book to be the equivalent of, or a
substitute for, a textbook or encyclopedia. From the nature of the case
the greater part of its contents deal with phases of the law which are
interesting from the viewpoint of the legal scholar,--close points where
the law is not settled, nice distinctions in terminology, or the historical
antecedents of rules (or reasons now given to support rules) which may
of themselves be by now well crystalized. The distinctive feature of the
book is that it collects in conveniently available form material scattered
through hundreds of volumes of publications otherwise available only in
a few large libraries and as to which no general index or digest is extanL
The book's primary appeal will be to students and teachers of the law of
this subject, as affording readings supplementing casebook instruction.
There, indeed, Judge Cardozo's prophecy of sanctity as a veritable book may
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